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INTRODUCTION
The trial court lacked the authority to modify a three-year-old judgment. No rule,
case, or statute allows modification of a judgment so many years after its entry. Neither
PacifiCorp nor the trial court specified any rule or authority governing the so-called
motion to enforce, and that is because no such authority exists.
PacifiCorp argues that the language of the judgment was clear. Why then, did it
feel the need to add additional language to the judgment? The fact is the language of the
judgment is ambiguous. Indeed, PacifiCorp cannot assert its position without referencing
additional facts and language. Likewise, the ambiguity of the judgment is evident by the
fact that law enforcement was not willing to enforce the judgment according to
PacifiCorp's overreaching interpretation of the order. Because the judgment is
ambiguous, the trial court should have required a new complaint before expanding the
scope of the injunction and, at least, held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. It is
procedurally improper for the trial court to rewrite the three-year-old judgment without
new evidence, particularly where the original judgment was the result, not of evidentiary
detennination, but default. Adding insult to injury, the movant requested, and the trial
court imposed, its expanded injunction that now invades Mr. Cardon's curtilage without
reference to the rule it is basing its ruling upon.
The default injunction entered in this case said nothing about allowing PacifiCorp
to cross defendant's curtilage and pass through his barnyard. It was in violation of the

rules and patently unfair for the trial court to expand the scope of the default injunction
beyond what PacifiCorp had demanded in its complaint and beyond the scope of the
default injunction that PacifiCorp drafted without requiring the filing of a new complaint.
OBJECTION TO PACIFICORP'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Perhaps in an effort to distract this Court from the significant errors in the lower
court's order and/or to prejudice this Court against Mr. Cardon, PacifiCorp dedicates
several pages of its brief to discussion of irrelevant and inappropriate "facts" that have no
bearing on the substance of this appeal. 1 Why the default judgment was entered, as well
as post-judgment actions by the parties are irrelevant to the issues on this appeal. The
relevant facts are that a default judgment was entered in 2011. Three years later, the
parties dispute the scope of that judgment according to its language, and the trial court
entered an order adding additional language to the judgment without complaint or
hearing. All other facts and allegation should be disregarded by the Court.

1

Mr. Cardon does not concede the "facts" PacifiCorp asserts. Had the trial court properly held an evidentiary
hearing, and had PacifiCorp asserted those "facts", and had they been relevant or material to the expansion of the
injunction PacifiCorp sought, Mr. Cardon would have had the opportunity to refute PacifiCorp's version of those
facts. This is precisely why this Court cannot let stand the rewritten and expanded judgment the trial court entered
without following proper procedure.
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ARGUMENT
A. The Trial Court Lacked Authority to Alter or Modify the Judgment
Many totalitarian regimes throughout history and throughout the world have had
glowing constitutions that proclaim human rights while their citizens suffer gross
indignities and deprivations. The one thing that distinguishes our government from those
with hollow promises of civil rights is procedure. Our courts require that proper
procedure be followed before a person is deprived of property or subjected to the
indignity of force or bully tactics. Mr. Cardon understands that PacifiCorp is an
important part of Cache Valley. But, though he is but a lowly farmer, Mr. Cardon is
entitled to the dignity of proper procedure before the Court allows this bully to run
roughshod over his property and rights. The trial court's order granting the motion to
enforce is not about enforcement; it is about modification. PacifiCorp's motion was a
motion to alter or amend in the guise of a motion to enforce. While the trial court would
have power to enforce its decree, modification of the decree is governed by specific rules
and law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, 60. Neither PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce nor the trial
court's order reference any Utah statute, rule, or case providing a basis for modification
or even clarification of the original injunction. That is because none can be found.
Even now in its brief, PacifiCorp cannot cite any controlling authority granting the
court the power to modify its three-year-old judgment. PacifiCorp cites to broad
statements by federal circuit courts about a district court's power to clarify, but ignores
governing Utah law that restricts the when and where of modification. See Utah R. Civ.
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P. 59, 60. "In our system, the rules provide the source of available relief. They are
designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts
can follow and rely upon." Workers Compensation Fund v. Argonaut Ins., 266 P. 3d 792
(Utah 2011) (quoting Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006). As the Argonaut court
explained, "[A] movant's failure to specify the rule governing the motion is unfairly
prejudicial to the opposing party, whose task in preparing a response to the motion is
made more difficult." Id. Here, PacifiCorp and the trial court provided no legal basis for
any modifications, clarifications, or additions to the judgment. The burden should not be
placed on this Court or on the appellant to identify the rule under which the relief was
granted.
PacifiCorp cites to Ward v. Richfield City, 776 p.2d 93, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
for the broad proposition that the court has inherent power to enforce its decree. See Brief
of Appellee at 13. However, what the Ward court instructs, and what PacifiCorp omitted,
is that "[t]he inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to enforce its
decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for equitable reasons due to changed
conditions is generally recognized." Ward, 776 p.2d at 96 (emphasis added to show
portion of quote omitted by appellee). Neither PacifiCorp nor the trial court identified any
changed conditions that would merit the modification of the injunction.
In this case, PacifiCorp seeks clarification of the Judgment through the addition of
supplementary language to the original order. This Court addressed this very issue in
Kunzler v. O'dell. 855 P. 2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Kunzler, the moving party filed
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a "Motion for Clarification." The Court explained, "A Motion for "Clarification of
Judgment" is not specifically provided for in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ... If the
clarity of the judgment is called into question because the opposing party is improperly
applying the judgment, then implicit in the motion is a request to change the judgment to
provide relief to a party harmed by the lack of clarity. Accordingly, we hold that in the
case before us, appellee's motion for clarification, in which appellants joined, was
sufficient to invoke Rule 60(b )." Id. at 274.
PacifiCorp cannot meet the requirements of Rule 60(b). PacifiCorp's motion was
not in the form of a rule 60 motion and it is questionable how it could be construed as
such. Its motion was neither captioned with a rule nor did it cite to any rules or other
authority. See Argonaut at797. Additionally, PacifiCorp's motion did not reference any
of the circumstances enumerated in Rule 60 as justifying relief from judgment. The
district court should have rejected the motion on those grounds alone. Most importantly,
the time for filing such a motion has long passed -

a point reiterated by PacifiCorp in its

brief. See Brief of Appellee at 25; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.). The trial court's alteration and
expansion of the 2011 injunction is much too late and not in harmony with the rules.

B. The Judgment is Ambiguous
PacifiCorp argues that the language of paragraph 9 of the Judgment is not
ambiguous, yet dedicates page after page of their brief discussing the alleged facts of the
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case. Likewise, the trial court held that the language was not ambiguous. R. 422. "A
judgment must be enforced as written if the language is clear and unambiguous."
Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P. 2d 389, 391-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Park City Utah
Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1978)). Whether a judgment is ambiguous
is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. Bettinger at 391
{Therefore, we are not required to give the trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous
judgment any particular weight, but review its interpretation under a correctness
standard.); see also Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Regional Sales
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Language is considered ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and
intention of the drafter are "insufficient in a sense that the [writing] may be understood to
reach two or more plausible meanings." Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254,257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
DePinto, 235 Kan. 331,681 P.2d 15, 17 (1984)); Eyring v. Fairbanks, 918 P. 2d 489,491
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (" A term is ambiguous if it has two or more possible
interpretations."); Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Ambiguous judgments are subject to the same rules of construction that apply to all
written instruments. Bettinger at 391. If the trial court determines the language is
ambiguous, it may resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the language.
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Paragraph 9 of the original Judgment stated:
Defendant is hereby immediately, permanently enjoined from the following:
9. Obstructing or preventing PacifiCorp access to Cutler Reservoir,
including access along the former county road or lane that connects
to Sam Fellow Road and that crosses through defendant's property.
Record at 241.
There is nothing in the language of the default injunction that would allow
PacifiCorp access beyond the termination of the county road. It is an injunction
preventing Mr. Cardon from interfering with PacifiCorp's access to Cutler Reservoir.
This position is in harmony with the other eight paragraphs of the Judgment, all of which
relate to trespass and damage to PacifiCorp property. There is absolutely no language in
the injunction that would be sufficient to create an easement through Cardon' s barnyard
beyond termination of the former county road or lane. Yet, this is the position PacifiCorp
now asserts. PacifiCorp argues that this language grants it, in essence, a de facto
prescriptive easement across Mr. Cardon's property and through his curtilage even
though the lane ends at the Cardon barnyard. As such, PacifiCorp needed to add the
following language to the original judgment to make the "unambiguous" judgment fit
what they wanted it to do: "This includes the lane that passes through Cardon's property
and connects with the route leading to PacifiCorp's property." Record at 432 (emphasis
in original).
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Further, the Davies' Declaration states that the Cache County Sherriffs Deputy
could not "definitively instruct" Cardon that the original order allows PacifiCorp to
access Cardon's barnyard. Record at 344. Because the language is ambiguous, subject to
more than one interpretation, the trial court was obligated to consider extrinsic evidence
and should have held an evidentiary hearing on the specific matter. A judge should not
rely upon his or her own memory of the matter. See Behrman v. Behrman, 139 P. 3d 307,
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citing 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments§ 188 (1994). Especially when
the previous judgment was not based upon evidence, but was the result of default.

CONCLUSION
The trial court lacked the authority to modify the three-year-old judgment. Even if
it had the authority without a new complaint to modify the injunction, the language of the
judgment is ambiguous and would at least require an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Appellant reaffirms his request for oral argument on this matter and believes that it would
significantly aid the decisional process.

2

2

Contrary to PacifiCorp's statement in the conc1usion to its brief, Appellant has requested oral argument. See Brief
of the Appellant at 16, titled: "REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT."
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